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Abstract 
International joint development programs are important because of their potential to reduce 
costs and increase partnership benefits such as interoperability, economies of scale, and 
technical advancement. However, the performance of international joint development 
programs varies greatly. This paper compares the best practices of international joint 
development and domestic development programs through case-study analysis to identify the 
key variables that contribute to a program’s eventual success or failure and to understand the 
elements that are crucial to managing these programs. 
Introduction 
The DoD recognizes the value of international joint development programs that 
include both research funding from and technology development with multiple countries. 
This is especially true in light of the Budget Control Act of 2011, which imposed caps on 
defense spending concurrent to European defense budget reductions. Additionally, the 
Defense Strategic Guidance issued in January 2012 commits the United States and the 
DoD to strengthening partnership with and cooperation in the global community by 
emphasizing pooling, sharing, and specializing capabilities with partner nations (DoD, 
2012b). Furthermore, the International Cooperation in Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics Handbook states that when considering the pursuit of an international joint 
development program, the Milestone Decision Authority must consider whether a program 
executes “demonstrated best business practices, including a plan for effective, economical, 
and efficient management of the international cooperative program” (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2012). While the value of 
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international joint development programs is recognized, a theoretical basis for best practices 
in these programs is a paucity. 
International joint development is not a novel idea. However, there is not yet 
consensus on what the design and management of successful international joint 
development programs looks like. The theoretical benefits of joint development projects 
include reduced costs, improved international cooperation, increased competition, and 
innovation. While unique combinations of these benefits drive each international program, 
most nations turn to international cooperation in defense acquisition to appease budget 
pressures and procure advanced programs that individual nations cannot financially afford. 
Utilizing the existing literature on best practices in both single nation and international joint 
development programs, this report investigates whether best practices have been actualized 
and what characteristics in the design and management of such programs equate to 
different outcomes.  
Through evidence garnered from acquisition literature, the study team has 
established eight characteristics that are crucial to program outcomes. This report conducts 
an initial analysis of how the eight characteristics affect program outcomes. This interim 
report compares these characteristics over three initial cases, and three additional cases will 
be included in the full technical report. The three initial cases included in this interim report 
are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) 
program, the Joint Strike Fighter F-35 Lightning II (F-35) program, and the Lightweight 
155mm Howitzer (M777) program.1 For this analysis, the study team focused on defining the 
program characteristics that contribute to each program’s challenges and successes. For 
the final technical report, the study team will build upon this research to develop a 
framework that will help guide future international cooperation in defense acquisition.  
Methodology  
To bolster the analysis, the study teem seeks to answer the research questions 
raised below. To achieve this, the study compares the defined best practices from 
acquisition literature with what the case studies have actualized by discussing what 
characteristics research has shown as crucial to international joint development program 
outcomes. The study team investigates these characteristics by interviewing program 
stakeholders from industry and government, as well as outside experts. Next, the study 
team uses the information gleaned from the interviews to assess the validity of the literature-
derived hypotheses defined below. Lastly, the study team analyzes three cases to better 
understand the elements critical to managing and designing successful international joint 
development programs. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In order to investigate the best practices of designing and managing international 
joint development programs in defense acquisition, the study team focused on two 
overarching research questions:  
                                            
 
 
1 The other three cases that will be analyzed in the final technical report for this study are the Medium 
Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), the Airbus A400M Atlas, and the Standard Missile-3 Block 
IIA program. 
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1. What are the characteristics of international joint development programs that 
result in positive or negative cost, scheduling, and end-product outcomes, 
such as a final product, interoperability, technical relevance, and 
development of existing defense industrial bases?2 
2. How are best practices of international joint development programs in 
defense acquisition different from best practices of single-nation acquisition 
programs?  
Additionally, four hypotheses are proposed to form a baseline for this analysis. 
These hypotheses were derived from a review of the existing literature on international joint 
development. This interim report will analyze these hypotheses to the extent feasible at this 
point in the research. The hypotheses are as follows:  
1. The structure of cooperation in international joint development programs 
matters—the international joint development programs whose stakeholders 
cooperate only during the development or production phases will have less 
successful cost, scheduling, and end-product outcomes.  
2. International joint development projects that are more grounded in security 
policies rather than economic efficiency interests are more likely to result in 
negative cost, scheduling, or end-product outcomes.  
3. Countries that have cooperated in defense acquisition before have a higher 
chance of achieving positive cost, scheduling, and end-product outcomes. 
4. Countries that are uniquely capable of producing complex acquisition 
programs benefit from working with smaller countries or industries who may 
have comparative advantages in certain technologies, but do not have the 
capacity to produce complex acquisition programs on their own.  
Interviews With Program Stakeholders 
The study team interviewed stakeholders from government and industry, as well as 
key leaders from research organizations to augment the information gleaned from the 
literature. The interviews focused on investigating which characteristics, out of the eight 
characteristics described in the section titled Case Study Analysis: Characteristics, each 
case manifested in addition to addressing the research questions and hypotheses. The 
interviews were accompanied by a Likert-scale survey to determine which characteristics the 
cases demonstrated. The survey results will be discussed in the section titled Case Study 
Analysis: Analysis. Figures 1–8 represent the results of the survey. Figures 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 
display the percentage of interviewees that voted for each response level. Figures 3, 7, and 
8 report the percentage of interviewees that voted for each response level for two related 
questions. The questions are indicated on the  and  axes.  
Case Study Analysis 
While the full technical report for this study will go into greater detail on each case’s 
history, this paper will touch upon key instances where there is evidence that the design and 
management of the program affected what actually happened, whether it be a success or a 
                                            
 
 
2 End-product outcomes are subjective to each case and successful end-product outcomes for each 
case will change depending on the purpose and goals of the program. 
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failure. When discussing the outcomes of the programs, the identified characteristics crucial 
to successfully designing and managing programs that are unique to international joint 
development programs will be analyzed to further investigate which characteristics are 
attributable to whether the program achieved its goals.  
The NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Program 
The first inklings of the AGS program began in the early 1990s when NATO’s 
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) called for both higher standardization and 
interoperability of NATO alliance equipment and using cooperative development and 
production to realize the theoretical economic and technological benefits cooperation 
presents. Additionally, the United States’ use of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 
System (JSTARS)3 during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 accentuated the paramount role 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities played in next-generation 
warfare (Chao, 2004). The original proposal for the AGS program was a “NATO-owned and 
operated core AGS capability, supplemented by interoperable national assets” (Chao, 2004, 
p. 5). Interviewees emphasized that when making decisions throughout the program, 
decision makers needed to ensure that there was a European face on the project, and that it 
was an inclusive NATO program. 
It was not until 2009 that the 15 NATO partners signed a Program Memorandum of 
Understanding (PMOU) agreeing to the legal and budgetary framework for acquiring AGS 
(NATO, 2009). During the 14 years it took for the program to go from inception in 1995 to a 
PMOU in 2009, numerous factors were collectively responsible for the delayed beginnings 
of the program. In 2007, financial circumstances put pressure on defense budgets in Europe 
that lead NATO to buy off-the-shelf Global Hawk Block 40 RQ-4s with Multi-Platform Radar 
Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) radars while the ground segment would be 
developed and procured by the European and Canadian partner nations (NATO, 2016).  
The Joint Strike Fighter F-35 Program 
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program began in 1995 as the latest iteration of the 
Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program. JAST, which was initiated in 1993 
following the bottom-up review of U.S. defense programs and policy, was originally designed 
to provide replacements for both the Navy’s A-6 Intruder attack aircraft and the Air Force’s 
F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole fighter. Two years later, an advanced short takeoff and 
vertical landing (ASTOVL) craft that was being developed by the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was congressionally directed to be incorporated into 
the JAST program, which would later be renamed the Joint Strike Fighter program.  
Two years after Lockheed Martin was awarded the prime contract for the F-35 
program in 2001, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) succinctly reiterated the 
purpose of the F-35 program: “The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of 
stealthy, strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. allies, with 
maximum commonality to minimize life-cycle costs” (Walker, 2003, p. 49). Furthermore, a 
major factor that influenced the international partner nations to join this program was to not 
only reap the anticipated operational and monetary benefits, but to develop a stronger 
                                            
 
 
3 Northrop Grumman’s E-8 JSTARS is an aircraft designed to conduct ground surveillance, command 
and control, and battle management. 
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relationship with the United States and to play a role in future strategic and military 
collaboration. 
In 2009, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 
Ashton Carter, issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), which led to the 
rescinding of Milestone B certification for JSF. This followed the release of the JET II report 
by DoD's Joint Estimating Team, which noted that JSF's system development and 
demonstration (SDD) phase would need an additional 30 months to complete, and JSF’s 
2010 Nunn-McCurdy breach (Gertler, 2014, pp. 9, 29). Additionally, the F-35 Program 
Executive Officer commissioned a technical baseline review (TBR) that led the Secretary of 
Defense to announce that testing of the F-35A and F-35C would be de-coupled from testing 
of the F-35B (DoD, 2010, p. 4). The review noted that the F-35B was experiencing 
“significant testing problems” and placed the program on “the equivalent of a two-year 
probation” (Gertler, 2014, p. 31) that was lifted January 20, 2012 (DoD, 2011, p. 5).  
According to the 2015 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOTE) report, the 
greatest challenge the F-35 faces today is affordability (DoD, 2015). While cost baselines, 
schedule projections, and technical capabilities have consistently not been met, the program 
has reestablished its baselines and recently shows progress in punctuality. For instance, 
according to the 2015 DOTE report, the number of 2015 actual test flights4 was only 7.4% 
below the scheduled amount. Compared to 2012, when only 34% of the planned flight tests 
had actually been executed, a 7.4 percentage point difference is a large improvement (DoD, 
2012a). Cost performance is also improved since 2012. 
The Lightweight 155mm Howitzer M777 Program 
The M777 was designed to replace the M-198 Howitzer, previously used by both the 
U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and the U.S. Army (USA), by introducing a lighter machine 
capable of higher fire speed and accuracy rates. M777’s request for proposal (RFP) stated 
that the platforms competing for the contract would first be presented at Yuma Proving 
Ground on April 25, 1996, and that the companies who were able to provide a platform that 
met the operational requirements detailed within the RFP would compete in a shoot-off and 
evaluation phase (U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army, 1999).  
The team of Textron and VSEL won the Engineering, Manufacturing, and 
Development (EMD) contract in March of 1997. Textron dropped out in 1998 and VSEL 
experienced some challenges in adapting to the American systems engineering process, 
which led to an initial delay pushed as VSEL restructured pre-production systems 
engineering tasks, and resulted in a program cost growth of $43 million. This restructuring 
also generated a 21-month program delay, from December 1999 to September 2001 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2000, pp. 7–8). 
In 1999, BAE Systems became the new M777 prime contractor when it acquired 
VSEL. BAE quickly began to encounter manufacturing challenges with the M777, many of 
which were driven by problems with titanium welding on the M777. Despite these 
challenges, M777 has found a larger market, suggesting a successful end-product outcome. 
In the initial conceptualization of the program, it was planned that the Marine Corps and 
Army would be the only groups to acquire the platform. However, in the past decade the 
                                            
 
 
4 As of November 2015 
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United States has utilized foreign military sales (FMS) to provide the M777 to allies across 
the globe following the M777’s successful deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Characteristics 
In order to address the first research question, 
What are the characteristics of international joint development programs that 
result in positive or negative cost, scheduling, and end-product outcomes 
such as a final product, interoperability, technical relevance and development 
of existing defense industrial bases?,5 
the study team identified eight characteristics that research and interviews with stakeholders 
have shown to be the most crucial and unique to impacting outcomes of international joint 
programs:  
1. Integration 
2. Number of Participating Countries 
3. Decision Making 
4. Commitment 
5. Flexibility 
6. Alignment of Operational Needs 
7. Tradeoff between Leading-edge Technology and Cost 
8. Workshare Distribution 
The first characteristic is integration. As part of a Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) project on complexity, Jeffrey A. Drezner, a senior policy 
researcher at RAND Corporation, discussed how organizational complexity is inherent in 
modern acquisition programs. Drezner (2009) stated that, “Organizational complexity 
addresses the structures and interactions of the government and industry organizations 
responsible for system design, development, production, and support” (p. 32). One complex 
aspect unique to international cooperation is the transnational partnerships that must be 
made for governments and industries to work together. Consequently, deeper layers of 
complexity exist: first, between governments; second, between government and industry; 
and third, between industries. In 2003, GAO published a report that argued “[t]he 
collaborative relationship between the customer and the product developer is essential to 
driving down operating and support costs” (p. 6). This study decided to focus on 
transnational relationships by analyzing the level of integration between the players 
involved. 
The second characteristic is the number of participating countries. In 2012, defense 
economist Keith Hartley claimed that the number of partner nations in acquisition programs 
is associated with collaboration inefficiencies. Furthermore, the increasing number of partner 
nations adds additional layers of complexity.  
The third characteristic is whether decision making throughout the program 
depended more on operational needs that could not be met by competing systems or on 
                                            
 
 
5 End-product outcomes are subjective to each case and successful end-product outcomes for each 
case will change depending on the purpose and goals of the program. 
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diplomatic and political needs. Major program decisions, such as those on requirements or 
contracting, are either based on operational needs, or political and diplomatic needs. Making 
decisions based on operational needs that could not be met by competing systems is more 
likely to achieve efficient costs and resource allocation, while decisions based on political or 
diplomatic demands might not reach the most cost-efficient outcomes (Hartley, 2012, p. 20). 
The fourth characteristic is commitment. For programs to achieve the theoretical cost 
benefits of international joint development, partner nations need to be committed to the 
program. If one country defects, costs for the remaining countries will rise. Additionally, lack 
of commitment is a major warning sign that can lead to program failure.  
The fifth characteristic is program requirements and the program’s flexibility to 
respond to changing environments. The volatile technological and security environments of 
today require programs that can quickly change in response to emerging innovation and 
threats. Therefore, the management of programs must have the capacity to respond to 
changing environments without necessitating the termination of the program.  
The sixth characteristic is the extent to which operational goals of partner nations 
involved align. Having multiple militaries working together could introduce varying 
operational goals. In order to produce a successful end-product, partner nations need to 
have compatible goals so that the program stays focused and partner nations are equally 
invested in acquiring the capability.  
The seventh characteristic is whether the program was based on demand for 
leading-edge technology or based on demand for affordability. There is a tradeoff between 
achieving leading-edge technology and affordability structures, specifically economies of 
scale. Economies of scale exist when the scale of output increases to a point where the 
average per-unit costs of production begins to decrease. The exceptionally high cost of 
research and development (R&D) in modern defense acquisition is crucial to procuring 
technologically advanced capabilities. While the costs of R&D exhibit unremitting growth, the 
funds necessary to support R&D have shrunk in the United States and in U.S. partner 
nations. It is difficult to determine whether economies of scale will be achieved for a program 
from the outset. If a program decides to procure a system from scratch, it is not certain that 
the outcome will be successful enough to produce an adequate return on the initial 
investments made during R&D. This is increasingly risky if the program aims to procure 
leading-edge capabilities. Economies of scale are impossible to achieve before a final 
product has been developed and production has begun. It is uncertain whether a program 
based on leading-edge technology will reach levels of production that create cost-efficient 
output. International cooperation during development presents the opportunity to share 
costs of R&D over participants. From the outset, however, a program should elucidate 
whether the key mission is to achieve leading-edge technology or economies of scale.  
The eighth characteristic captures how the program distributes workshare. To 
achieve cost-efficient outcomes, international programs present greater opportunity for 
competition based on comparative advantage. Competition is critical to achieving cost-
efficiency because when there are many substitutable choices for consumers to choose 
from, suppliers will be forced to produce at the lowest cost possible since consumers will 
choose to buy the lowest-priced product. The international marketplace presents greater 
opportunity for competition among industries, which in turn supplies procurement at lower 
costs to the buyer. However, the international marketplace also introduces greater political 
and industrial-base variables into the equation. Costs are not typically the sole incentive for 
nations to participate in international cooperation in defense acquisition. Countries view 
strategic posture, trade policy, industrial gain, and technology transfer as spillover benefits 
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to international cooperation. In some cases, these spillover benefits are more important to a 
country than cost-efficiency. Focusing on spillover benefits more than focusing on cost-
efficiency will impact program outcomes and impact how countries work together.  
Consequently, the last characteristic crucial and unique to impacting outcomes of 
international joint programs is whether the distribution of workshare was based on 
participating countries’ comparative advantage or on political or industrial-base goals.  
Analysis 
Integration 
For the integration characteristic, the study team asked the interviewees, “On a scale 
of one to six, rate the level of integration between government and industry, governments, 
and industries for each program.” The responses are reported in Figure 1.  
 
 Extent of Integration 
The AGS and the F-35 programs practiced similar levels of integration between 
government and industry, while the M777 program was reported as more integrated by the 
majority of survey respondents. For the M777 program, a higher level of integration between 
government and industry existed because the government made the final decisions while 
there was collocation of employees from both government and industry where the two 
participating bodies would consult before final decisions were made. This colocation 
increased during production. For the F-35 program, the contract was more of a top-down 
relationship in terms of decision making. The level of relationship between government and 
industry often depended on the company in question, but the government was in charge of 
the program for all companies. For AGS, the relationship between government and industry 
was very strong and positive in some instances, but in other cases caused problems for the 
program. The most notable and positive relationship was between NATO and Northrop 
Grumman (NG), who consulted regularly from the outset. For other companies, the 
integration between industry and government occurred domestically. Due to the fact that 
each country wanted to secure its own investments, issues arose because it was difficult to 
create work for every country based solely on investment levels. Without higher levels of 
transnational integration, certain countries viewed that the level of their industries’ 
workshare was not worth the costs and defaulted from the program. 
The reported level of integration between governments for the three programs varied 
greatly. For the F-35 program, the most frequently chosen level was “decision-making 
integration.” The partnership between the governments involved in the program was not 
legally binding but did implement obligations that represented formal commitments between 
the partners. The decision-making mechanism between the partner nations was dominated 
by the United States, which had 80% voting power, while the other partners shared the 
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remaining 20%. The UK, which was the first partner nation involved, however, could levy 
requirement alterations because of its tier-one status.6 At the outset of the partnership, 
countries determined what was on their “must-have” and “nice-to-have” lists. Despite the 
unequal share of voting power and the eventual exclusion of most “nice-to-have” items, 
there have thus far been minimal defections and one interviewee argued that most partner 
nations were satisfied with at least one F-35 variant on an operational level. In addition, 
there were instances where non-U.S. partner nations teamed up to push for an operational 
requirement not initially planned by the United States. The mechanism encouraged the U.S. 
military branches and the partner nations to each coordinate their opinions before facing one 
another. 
For the NATO-operated AGS program, the survey responses for integration between 
governments were both higher and less variable as can be seen in Figure 1. NATO’s historic 
establishment as an intergovernmental organization bolstered AGS’ achievement of high 
integration between governments. Decisions made on the AGS program were consensus-
based with equal voting power for each partner nation. The study team did find, however, 
that formal voting arrangements did not always translate into how decision making works in 
practice. In a consensus-based voting mechanism, notionally every nation comes to the 
table with an equal stake in achieving their goals. In reality, there are the strong players and 
the followers during decision making. Typically, newly ascended or smaller partner nations 
fall into the latter category. When the larger contributing nations reached consensus, the 
other participating nations were generally quick to follow. Additionally, when there was 
disagreement between the larger players, delays could and did happen. Holdout partners 
could be outmaneuvered as long as the remaining nations all agreed, but escalation to 
direct contact between national leadership was sometimes necessary to resolve 
disagreement. While NATO as an organization has a strong institutional memory, 
throughout the first 15 years of the program there was not a standing office for joint 
acquisition. Instead, the designated NATO equivalent to a program office—the NATO AGS 
Management Agency (NAGSMA)—was not created until the PMOU was signed in 2009. 
This late organization standup cost the program the benefits of institutional memory 
because NAGSMA had not been present during the previous 14 years of the program. 
For the M777 program, the United States established and built the program, and 
while the United States consulted with the other nations involved, the program was 
ultimately U.S.-led with unilateral decisions on requirements. International cooperation 
evolved when other nations decided that this program fulfilled their operational needs and 
joined the program. The partner-nation governments each had a representative collocated in 
the U.S.-based program office, but these foreign representatives were there for information 
gathering, rather than for sharing leadership. 
For the integration between industries in the AGS program, the prime contractor, NG, 
controlled intra-industry relations. The AGS program was developed on the concept that 
cost share equaled workshare. Some experts argue that this concept contributed to the 
drawn-out, 14-year process of choosing the platform and signing the PMOU. Since 
European industry wanted access to U.S. technology, it was less desirable for the European 
                                            
 
 
6 Tier levels were made based on investment levels. The UK is the only tier-one partner nation and is 
the partner nation who has invested the most money after the United States. 
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partner nations to choose a platform manufactured by the United States because of U.S. 
hesitancy to share technology. This meant that, with a U.S. platform, there was not a 
sufficient ratio between cost and workshare. However, from the outset of the program, NG 
wanted to not only become the prime contractor for the AGS program, but to build a stronger 
relationship with European industry. To do this, NG built personal and professional 
relationships through consultation with a “we’re all in this together” attitude. Once the Global 
Hawk was chosen for the air segment, NG held responsibility for the intra-industry relations. 
From a U.S. perspective, any arrangement of industry cooperation was acceptable, as long 
as it lead to the best value.  
The industries involved with the F-35 program had integrated decision-making 
processes; however, commercial tension between industries existed because of 
competition. Consequently, industries were less integrated during development and 
production. However, higher levels of integration during sustainment is anticipated, and 
tensions over competition appear likely to fade. One of the interviewees reported that, 
governments were more inclined to share information and work together than the industry 
partners.  
For industry integration during the M777 program, one respondent marked the lowest 
value out of the three programs for this response. Interviewees, however, indicated that the 
prime contractor, BAE Systems, had regular consultation on decisions between the other 
industries involved. The prime and sub-contractors were more integrated here because BAE 
Systems controlled contracting with the sub-contractors. Regular consultations occurred 
between contractors when developing the system and throughout manufacturing. This was 
crucial for cutting-edge technologies. However, as the program matured, consultations 
happened less frequently.  
Number of Participants  
For the number of participating countries characteristic, the study team asked the 
interviewees, “On a scale of one to six, rate the extent to which the number of countries 
involved with the program impacted major decisions.” The results are displayed in Figure 2.  
 
 Number of Participating Countries 
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The number of countries participating in the AGS program varied from inception, and 
today 15 countries officially participate in the program.7 In terms of participating countries, 
the AGS program has the highest number out of the cases analyzed for this study. Multiple 
interviewees discussed the program’s core need to be an Alliance program with a European 
face. Furthermore, from the outset, the program wanted to include as many nations as 
possible while staying cost effective and maintaining operational requirements. 
Consequently, the number of nations involved always impacted the program, mirroring what 
the interviewees said. The core program characteristics of putting a European face on the 
program and including as many Alliance member-states as possible influenced many of the 
twists and turns the program took over its 20+ years of existence. Every decision made had 
to support inclusion and diversity at the same time that it satisfied each partner nation’s 
investments and national interests; for instance, the United States originally offering 
JSTARS for the air segment faced political backlash. The United States then offered to use 
JSTARS radar technology on an Airbus aircraft. This caused further problems with 
technology gains desired by the EU and was ultimately an unsuccessful solution. Although 
the influence that the number of countries had on decision making throughout the program 
presented challenges, the large number of participating nations also kept the program 
moving forward. One expert from government noted that if there had been fewer partner 
nations, the program would have been more likely to fall apart because it would have lacked 
the broad political support within NATO to push the program forward.  
Similarly, multiple interviewees from the F-35 program argued that the higher number 
of countries participating in the F-35 program prevented the program from being cancelled in 
the face of challenges. Unlike the AGS program, the experts interviewed responded very 
differently from each other on the characteristic describing the number of participating 
countries in the program. The study team has concluded that the varied responses for this 
characteristic can be attributed to different perspectives from different partner nations. 
Unlike the NATO-driven AGS program, the F-35 program is U.S.-centric. The United States 
is harder to integrate with for many of the participating nations because of the size and 
technical edge of the U.S. defense industrial base as well as technology transfer laws. 
Historically, the UK, Canada, and Australia have an easier time with this because of the 
long-term relationship that they have had with the United States and information sharing. 
Consequently, some partner nations feel that the sheer number of participants influenced 
decision making during the program, while other partner nations do not view the number of 
participants as a unique driver of decision making.  
The interviewees for the M777 program unanimously chose “slight influence” for how 
the number of participants affected decision making during the program. The small number 
of partner nations coupled with the U.S.-centric program left little room for the number of 
partners to cause complications.  
Decision Making 
For the decision making characteristic, the study team first asked the interviewees, 
“On a scale of one to six, rate the extent to which decisions regarding the program were 
made depending on operational needs that could not be met by competing systems.” 
                                            
 
 
7 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the United States. 
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Second, the study team asked, “On a scale of one to six, rate the extent to which decisions 
regarding the program were made depending on diplomatic or political needs.” The results 
are in Figure 3. 
 
 Decision Making 
For the AGS program, one of the interviewees noted that decision making depended 
on different factors that changed over the different stages of the program. Another 
interviewee noted that, for some nations, decision making depended on operational needs in 
some instances, but considered industrial-base needs other times. AGS directly responded 
to NATO’s demand for both ISR capabilities and NATO Alliance equipment standardization 
and interoperability in the early 1990s. However, political factors for the AGS program were 
typically rated higher, which is not surprising given the inclusive alliance goals discussed in 
the Analysis: Number of Participants section. For some member states, acquiring the AGS 
system did not necessarily respond to their domestic strategic goals. Instead, these member 
states participated with the intention of either being good NATO partners or investing for the 
benefit of domestic industrial-base interests. For instance, governments who wanted their 
domestic constituent industries to benefit would be more likely to participate and contribute 
money. Additionally, the political and diplomatic pressures of periodic summits and major 
NATO events facilitated decision making during the program. When examining the timing of 
major decisions throughout the program and major summits or events, there is clear 
alignment. For example, the AGS procurement contract was signed at the 2012 Chicago 
Summit. These types of events accelerated key program milestones and decisions.  
For the F-35 program, one interviewee was reluctant to rate “always depended” on 
operational needs, even though at the outset, the goals were to pursue, develop, and design 
based on the operational requirements of the predicted evolving security threats. As the 
program developed, additional countries joined through scheduled foreign military sales 
(FMS). FMS decisions were partially based on competing interests and best value rather 
than purely operational requirements. The responses rating the extent to which decision 
making depended on diplomatic or political needs for the F-35 program are more in the 
middle. One of the interviewees from a foreign government chose “depended more than 
occasionally,” because that country chose to participate in the F-35 program not only to reap 
the operational capabilities, but to also strengthen their interoperability with the United 
States and allied nations in the future. One interviewee discussed how operational 
requirements concerns drove decision making during the development stages of the 
program, while during and after the transition to follow-on development and production, 
political and diplomatic needs became more important. This could be attributed to the fact 
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that the UK and United States cooperated from the outset, and as the program moved 
forward, other partner-nations joined, which added political concerns, national sovereignty 
requirements, and diplomatic interests.  
The responses for the M777 program on whether decision making depended on 
operational needs conflict each other. While two interviewees rated decision making 
depending on operational needs as a six, “always depended,” one interviewee rated a one, 
“never depended.” For the United States, there were no competing systems at the time. The 
USMC and the USA jointly needed the lightweight and digitized firing system capabilities the 
M777 offered. The UK similarly had a demand for this technology that at the time had no 
competing systems. The Falklands War made it obvious that the UK’s land munitions lacked 
M777’s capabilities. The UK’s large stakes in this operational requirement made them the 
dominating industry when competing for the contract. The interviewees rated lower for the 
dependence of decision making on diplomatic or political needs for the M777 program. The 
reason why some of the survey respondents chose the third level, “depended occasionally,” 
is that the UK had already been developing this type of capability in response to their 
operational gaps during the Falklands War. Yet, due to the U.S. Arsenal Act, the United 
States had to establish a domestic supply chain. In the end, 70% of the program was made 
in the United States despite the UK’s effort at establishing the capacity to do so.  
Commitment 
For the commitment characteristic, the study team asked the interviewees, “On a 
scale of one to six, rate the extent to which commitments for the program stated in the 
contract or PMOU were binding.” No particular conclusions could be drawn from the M777 
program for this characteristic. The responses rating the extent to which commitments are 
binding are displayed in Figure 4.  
 
 Commitment  
There is evidence that these divergences can be imputed to differences in point of 
views from government and industry. For the AGS program, one interviewee expressed that 
NATO worked hard to put in disincentives for partner nations to quit. At the same time, 
another interviewee emphasized the importance of having disincentives, but not to the point 
that nations only stay in the program because the consequences of defecting are too harsh. 
It was equally important for the partner nations to benefit from participation as it was to 
prevent defection. 
Responses to the commitment characteristic are also split for the F-35 program. 
When following-up with the interviewees, the study team found that one point of view argued 
that there are limited explicit measures to prevent defection. Instead, the partner nations 
made large investments that are ultimately a sunk cost if the country exits the program 
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without procuring the capability. This situation acts as a measure to prevent defection but 
was not explicitly planned in the PMOU or contracts. Furthermore, countries who are 
benefiting from industrial spillovers have a disincentive to defect because exiting the 
program would mean losing industrial benefits. Another interviewee concluded that instead 
of being contractually binding, countries have moral, ethical, and political commitments to 
the program that act as measures to prevent defection. 
Flexibility 
For the flexibility characteristic, the study team asked the interviewees, “On a scale 
of one to six, rate the level of flexibility the program had in being able to change 
requirements in response to program updates such as an addition of participating countries 
or new developments.” The results are displayed in Figure 5.  
 
 Flexibility 
While the AGS program maintained its operational and political requirements made 
from the outset, the technical specifications on which these goals would be executed 
changed multiple times over 14 years of negotiations. These changes were made not 
necessarily because the program was flexible, but more so because the political nature of 
the program demanded it. To reiterate, the original mantra of the program was to include as 
many flags as possible. This level of complexity inherently faced political stalls, aggressive 
workshare negotiations, and affordability challenges. Whether or not these changes were 
“high hurdles” or “easy” depends on who is talking. Ultimately, the program had to be 
flexible, even if this meant 15 years of negotiations before the PMOU.  
The interviewees for the F-35 program emphasized that the number of partner 
nations and increasing cost pressures created high hurdles for change. As a result of 
schedule delays, certain nations had to invest additional money to maintain their existing 
fleets on top of the money already invested in the F-35 program. These countries would 
have been more flexible and able to manage this situation if these risks were addressed 
from the outset. Daunting cost estimates were another barrier to flexibility. According to an 
interviewee, the vast majority of proposed changes were generally dropped after the 
proposing country saw the estimated cost increases. Additionally, bureaucracy imposed 
organizational constructs that controlled decision making within cost, schedule, and 
performance and did not work well with change.  
From the discussion on the M777 program, there is evidence that the highest hurdles 
to flexibility existed between the services and not the international partners. Otherwise, there 
were a limited number of cases demanding a change to the program.  
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Operational Mission 
For the operational mission characteristic, the study team asked the interviewees, 
“On a scale of one to six, rate the extent to which the countries involved with the program 
were compatible in operational requirements.” The responses are displayed in Figure 6.  
 
 Alignment of Operational Needs 
For the AGS program, the individual countries were less coherent on their core 
operational demands. Since this was a NATO program, however, the countries participating 
all agreed that the Alliance needed to satisfy the demand for ISR capabilities and greater 
interoperability and collaboration within NATO. The United States, for instance, already had 
access to this capability. Their interests were centered on helping NATO achieve this 
capability so that the United States would not be called upon to bolster strategic demands 
requiring ISR. Conversely, smaller nations could not achieve this capability on their own. 
Even if the need for leading-edge ISR capabilities is not in a nation’s core strategy, having a 
more public access to ISR technology through NATO, benefits both their domestic and 
international security. Consequently, the participating partner nations do not perfectly align 
with their domestic interests, but, as a whole, the AGS program supports a common 
demand.  
Similar to the AGS program, the partner nations of the JSF program did not have 
identical operational requirements, but because there are three variants of the program, 
major requirements for each country were met. The level of operational commonality 
between partner nations changes according to the country. Compared to the United States, 
the UK’s level is more of a five or a six while Turkey’s level is more a three or a four. 
Strategically, all partner nations are interested in interoperability, which acquiring the F-35 
promotes. One interviewee suggested that the variance of responses is a result of changing 
operational requirements between times of peace and times of war.  
Program Mission 
For the program mission characteristic, the study team first asked the interviewees, 
“On a scale of one to six, evaluate the extent to which the mission of the program was 
based on the demand for leading-edge technology and a lower number of initial output.” 
Second, the study team asked, “Evaluate the extent to which the program was based on the 
demand for developing low-cost economies of scale.” The results are displayed in Figure 7. 
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 Tradeoff Between Leading-Edge Technology and Cost 
The study team hypothesized that there is a tradeoff between these two underlying 
program goals. The survey responses, however, suggest that this is not the case. Or, rather, 
program directors did not consider them to be a tradeoff. For the AGS program, NATO was 
acquiring a leading-edge technology, but not necessarily developing it. The ISR capability 
NATO wanted to acquire already existed (JSTARS), just not as a platform that was NATO 
owned and operated. The United States tried its best to preserve and expand upon the 
leading-edge technology they had already developed with JSTARS to meet AGS 
requirements, despite understanding that there were other political dimensions it had to 
simultaneously account for. The underlying tradeoff was achieving new technology for 
Europe and keeping the program affordable. Before deciding on the Global Hawk RQ-4B 
Block 40 for the air segment, NG tried to work through the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) process and make the more leading-edge capabilities exportable and 
deliverable to NATO. However, no new development solution was found that could satisfy 
export regulations, European participation requirements, nor the affordability requirements, 
which is why compromises continually had to be made. Financial circumstances in the 
2000s caused the program to procure the RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40 which was an 
already developed capacity. Even after the PMOU in 2009, AGS on its own does not 
achieve economies of scale. The additional USAF’s procurement of RQ-4B Block 40, 
however, does create economies of scale, which helps AGS achieve higher cost efficiency.  
What is notable about the responses for the F-35 program is that most respondents 
rated high levels for the program mission being based on both leading-edge technology and 
economies of scale. On the surface, the survey results reject the hypothesis that there is a 
tradeoff between leading-edge technology and low-cost economies of scale. The 
discussions with interviewees confirm, however, that this tradeoff still exists. Since the 
inception of JAST, which later became the F-35, the program was entirely based on 
acquiring a leading-edge fifth generation fighter. One interviewee, however, did note that the 
extent to which leading-edge technology prioritized over affordability depended on the 
service or partner nation. For example, while the USAF is buying the most F-35s and as a 
replacement fighter, the USN is using the F-35 to augment its current capabilities. 
Consequently, the USAF is more likely to rate the level of demand for leading-edge 
technology as a five or a six while the USN is more likely to rate it at a level four or five. 
Despite this difference, all the interviewees rated the program on the higher end of the scale 
of demand for leading-edge technology.  
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Affordability has been advertised from the outset of the F-35 program. Whether the 
program emphasized affordability to gloss the brochure sent to potential partner nations, or 
as a primary focus is unclear. Nothing about the leading-edge technology in the F-35 
program is low cost. From the Nunn-McCurdy cost breach to the continuous LRIP, the 
program has consistently pushed prospects for economies of scale into the future. The 
program does, however, present opportunities for relatively low-cost production down the 
road if a global fleet in the four-digits is procured. With a large global fleet, low-cost 
sustainment will more likely be able to reap the benefits from global spare parts and supply 
chains, as well as economies of scale. Tagging affordability to this program from the outset 
was not realistic and could be considered a major source of the criticism the program has 
seen to date. One interviewee from government emphasized that the entire purpose of 
acquiring a fifth-generation fighter was technology. If the services wanted economies of 
scale, they could have procured more F-16s and F-18s for the Air Force and Carrier 
versions, respectively.  
Workshare Distribution 
For the workshare distribution characteristic, the study team first asked the 
interviewees, “On a scale of one to six, rate the extent to which the distribution of workshare 
was based on participating countries’ comparative advantage.” Second, the study team 
asked, “Rate the extent to which the distribution of workshare was based on political or 
industrial-base goals.” The responses are displayed in Figure 8. 
 
 Basis of Workshare Distribution 
The responses for the AGS program reflect the program’s blueprint. Interviewees 
rated the workshare level based on political or industrial-base goals generally higher than 
how they rated the workshare level based on comparative advantage. This is no surprise, 
given the political nature of the AGS program’s core goals. On the ground segment, stations 
were already available from the United States; however, this would have defeated the goal 
of high participation levels from the European partner nations. The program paid for a NATO 
ground station because it was ITAR-free and available for use in other European programs. 
While basing workshare distribution on comparative advantage is often times more 
economically efficient, the program would not have been able to exist without politically-
based decision making. Spain, for example, withdrew from the program after not receiving 
enough industry participation. Although distributing workshare based on comparative 
advantage presents opportunities for cost efficiency, political and industrial base factors can 
be equally crucial in order to sustain program participation.  
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The workshare distribution for the F-35 program is proportionate to the level of 
investment a partner-nation contributes to the program. There would not have been factories 
built from scratch in Turkey where workforces were trained from ground zero if the 
workshare distribution was not constructed in this fashion. Additional political factors 
influenced workshare distribution as well. For example, supplementary wing production 
opened in the state of Georgia because that facility was facing an existential crisis from lack 
of work, not because producing wings in Georgia was the most efficient allocation of 
resources. Some countries were disappointed from the low-level of integration for 
technology-transfer, as technology-transfer laws significantly influenced the distribution of 
workshare. As one interviewee explained, if a country writes a piece of software, that 
software is property of the country, not the program. Because of this, technology-intensive 
production was automatically allocated to the United States.  
The M777 program is a prime example of when political factors become more 
important than comparative advantage. Despite the fact that the UK had been developing 
the technology needed for this program, the USA and USMC were ordered by the Senate 
and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense in 1999 to develop a plan to utilize 
Rock Island Arsenal in producing various portions of M777 (U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. 
Army, 1999). This is yet another example of how monetary costs and benefits are not the 
only ways to measure efficiency with international cooperation. Furthermore, economic 
efficiency should not be the only measure of success here.  
Initial Results 
This interim report discusses what the study team can preliminarily conclude, while 
the full technical report of this study will provide a more comprehensive conclusion of the 
hypotheses. The final report will also develop a framework for designing and managing 
successful international joint development programs. In regards to the second research 
question,  
How are best practices of international joint development programs in 
defense acquisition different from best practices of single-nation acquisition 
programs?,  
the study team found that both the single-nation and international defense acquisition 
programs of today face the different levels of complexities that Drezner (2009) recognized: 
organizational, environmental, and technical. The underlying difference between single-
nation acquisition programs and international joint development programs is the high level of 
organizational complexity inherent in international cooperation. While modern single-nation 
defense programs face the complexities associated with integrating government and 
industry, international programs must also intermingle governments and international 
industries. To successfully overcome both the environmental and technical complexities of 
modern programs and manage the inherent organizational complexities of international 
programs, appropriate governance models that practice consolidation, flexibility, risk-
management, and institutional memory are more likely to succeed in reaping the benefits 
international programs theoretically can achieve.  
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The following discussion considers the four hypotheses to the highest extent 
possible at this point in the research effort.8 
The first hypothesis of this study is as follows:  
The structure of cooperation in international joint development programs 
matters: The international joint development programs whose stakeholders 
cooperate only during the development or production process will have less 
successful cost, scheduling, and end-product outcomes.  
The countries participating in all three of the programs analyzed for this report participated 
during both the development and production phases. Consequently, the study team cannot 
confidently conclude whether the international joint development programs whose 
stakeholders cooperated only during the development or production process will have less 
successful program outcomes. However, the study team can use the results of the survey to 
extrapolate correlations between how successful programs were in achieving their goals and 
the level of integration between governments and industries. The interviewees from the 
M777 program, for example, rated higher levels of integration between government and 
industry than the interviewees from the F-35 and AGS programs. Looking at the history of 
the three programs, the M777 program executed the quickest contracting and signing of the 
PMOU. Additionally, unlike the F-35 program and the AGS program, the M777 program 
interviewees rated lower levels of integration between governments. The AGS and F-35 
programs’ interviewees similarly rated higher levels for these two characteristics. The AGS 
program took the longest to reach contracting and signing of the PMOU, while the JSF has 
experienced the most cost increases and schedule delays. 
Second, the study team hypothesized, 
International joint development programs that are more grounded in security 
policies rather than economic efficiency interests are more likely to result in 
negative cost, scheduling, or end-product outcomes.  
The AGS program’s interviewees rated that the AGS program “often depended” or 
“always depended” on diplomatic or political needs, while the F-35 and M777 program 
interviewees never rated more than “often depended” for decision making based on 
diplomatic or political needs. Similarly, the AGS and F-35 program interviewees rated higher 
levels for workshare distribution being based on political or industrial-base goals than the 
interviewees for the M777 program. Program decision making and distribution of workshare 
are two areas where programs based decisions on costs and comparative advantage, or on 
political and industrial base goals that often reflect international and domestic security 
policies. While there were a high number of instances where the AGS program depended 
more on diplomatic or political needs, this does not always translate to negative outcomes. 
On the one hand, this could have contributed to the long period of time it took the program 
to reach a contract and PMOU. On the other hand, this was critical for the program to 
maintain its end-product goal of including as many NATO member-states as possible in 
order to put a European face on the program. The program successfully achieved its 
                                            
 
 
8 At this point in the research effort, the study team has only analyzed three out of the six case 
studies of this case-study analysis. 
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Alliance-based goals thanks to the program’s ability to meet political factors reflecting 
different nation’s security policies. 
Third, the study team hypothesized,  
Countries who have cooperated in defense acquisition before have a higher 
chance of achieving positive cost, scheduling and end-product outcomes. 
As previously discussed, the number of participating countries in a joint international 
program is a notable characteristic. While the study team has found that a higher number of 
partner nations supports a program’s ability to move forward without cancellation, the 
number of countries involved often means that choices must be made in light of a diverse 
number of actors and while satisfying numerous investments, international interests, and 
domestic interests. Based on this hypothesis, the study team expected to see more positive 
outcomes with the AGS program based on the fact that the countries involved have 
historically worked together before through NATO. Information gleaned from the stakeholder 
interviews suggests that the office dedicated to integrating the program, NAGSMA, did not 
achieve the positive outcomes of a strong institutional memory because this office was not 
set up until the official PMOU was signed in 2009, 14 years after program inception. The F-
35 program partially reaped benefits from having partner countries who have a history of 
cooperation in the past. Multiple interviewees noted how the United States, UK, Australia, 
and Canada were more fluidly integrated in the F-35 program because of their past 
experiences working together. However, it is hard to connect this to overall program 
outcomes because most participating nations are not a part of this construct. 
Fourth, the study team hypothesized, 
Countries who are uniquely capable of producing complex acquisition 
programs benefit from working with smaller countries or industries who may 
have comparative advantages in certain technologies but do not have the 
capacity to produce complex acquisition programs on their own.  
The research conducted thus far strongly supports the fourth hypothesis. For the AGS 
program, the United States had the ISR capabilities demanded by the program from the 
outset. They benefited, however, from working with the various-sized countries of NATO, as 
it ensured that the United States would not be the sole provider of support for NATO 
operations requiring ISR capabilities. Additionally, the United States benefitted from the 
partner nation’s requirement to have a European face on the program because of the 
shared maintenance and lifecycle costs. Furthermore, all nations benefitted from 
international participation for the F-35 program because the leading-edge technology 
achieved by the program would not have been financially feasible by any one nation.  
Concluding Thoughts 
Globalizing the defense market at the research and development stages of 
acquisition poses crucial benefits for partner nations in light of budget pressures in the 
United States and Europe. In order to reap these benefits, international joint development 
programs must follow best practices. This interim report has identified eight characteristics 
critical to programs’ capacity to achieve best practices. These eight characteristics impact 
the program’s ability to achieve desired cost, scheduling, and end-product outcomes.  
Based on the work conducted thus far, several of the characteristics are promising 
grounds from which best practices can be derived. For instance, interviewees across 
multiple programs agreed that including more member countries adds organizational 
complexity which can cause negative program outcomes such as schedule delays. Starting 
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with a small group before reaching the PMOU may avoid some of these problems, although 
as AGS showed, a large group of countries does give a program momentum. Choosing the 
right partners is also important; as discussed in hypothesis three, institutional memory of 
past collaboration can contribute to better results. In other words, countries who are new to 
working together face greater challenges but simultaneously pave the way for future 
success. Additionally, many programs appear to be overestimating their ability to 
simultaneously pursue leading edge technology and economics of scale, with the latter often 
falling by the wayside. Multiple interviewees mentioned setting key parameters and 
anticipating technology transfer hurdles early in the process. However, adopting an attitude 
of humility about what joint development projects can actually achieve from a cost 
perspective may also be a critical first step. 
The study team will continue analyzing three additional cases, the Standard Missile-3 
Block IIA program, the A400M Atlas program, and the Medium-Extended Air Defense 
System program, in addition to those discussed in this report. This analysis will further 
develop the results of the hypotheses and bolster the framework for designing and 
managing international joint development programs in the future.  
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